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Abstract
As the frequency and intensity of disasters increases so too does the need to take
proactive measures to reduce disaster risk. Across the nation local, state, and federal
emergency managers work collaboratively to implement hazard mitigation programs that
seek to reduce disaster risk. This study examined the factors that influence hazard mitigation
governance in FEMA Region III states including Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. The results showed that organizational
capacity, networks, collaborative governance, and community engagement all influence local
and state adoption of hazard mitigation projects. The results also showed that there is a need
to reduce the complexity of hazard mitigation programs, innovate to reduce disaster risk, and
prioritize equity into the administration of hazard mitigation programs.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Across the United States communities are faced with an increase in the frequency and
intensity of natural disasters (Berke et al., 2014). Spurred by the impacts of climate change,
(Karl et al., 2009) these disasters are challenging even the most robust communities. Rather
than remaining in a perpetual cycle of disaster response and recovery, communities are
choosing to break the cycle of disaster through adoption of hazard mitigation programs
(Berke et al., 2014).
Climate change is challenging even the most resilient communities. Scientists
acknowledge the link between climate change (Harvey, 2018) and more frequent
disasters (Joyner & Orgera, 2014; Allen, 2006). Increasing instances of disasters are
disproportionately impacting communities with increased social vulnerability (Sullivan &
Schwartz, 2018). Often communities with the least resources pre-disaster, receive the least
assistance during a disaster. Furthermore women, children, minorities, and the elderly are
often the most vulnerable to impacts of disaster (Miller, 2020). What is clear is that
government officials must break the cyclical response and recovery cycle.
While communities across the nation have taken measures to reduce disaster
risk, they have been largely unsuccessful in meeting the demand that originates from rising
disasters. Explosive population growth in vulnerable areas and a changing climate are driving
up disaster losses (Berke et al., 2014). One needs to look no further than the 2017 hurricane
season, where three of the five costliest disasters impacted the United States, (Government
Accountability Office, 2018) to truly understand the increased disaster risk. This
rapid increase in economic losses has been occurring for decades, resulting from deliberate
building and settlement practices of humans (Mileti, 1999), and researchers expect more
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frequent billion-dollar disasters (Peacock et al., 2008). In 2020 the United States experienced
a record setting 22 billion dollar disasters, more than any other year since the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) began keeping records (National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, 2021).
Hazard mitigation programs seek to reduce disaster risk to the built and human
system (Berke et al., 2014). As a United States government policy area, hazard mitigation
refers to any sustained action taken to reduce long-term risk and future disasters (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2021b). In the United States, much of the funding
originates through federal grant programs which augment state and local expenditures to
implement widespread projects. Despite the fact that local communities, typically through the
legal authorities of local government agencies, implement these programs, the federal
government, by proxy of their funding mechanisms and programs, drive nationwide policy
for hazard mitigation. Even with growing disaster losses, since 2000 there has been a trend
away from investment in hazard mitigation programs and funding from the federal
government (Ji & Lee, 2019). Local governments often do not act on mitigation projects
alone, revenue issues combined with competing priorities often result in non-investment (Ji
& Lee, 2019). This divestment has had a negative impact on mitigation policy and
implementation nationwide (Ji & Lee, 2019).
The federal government has a vested interest in reducing disaster risk since they bear
the burden of most post-disaster recovery costs (Berke et al., 2014). They also have
committed to fulfilling the requirements for global disaster risk reduction as codified through
the United Nations (Walter, 2020). The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) administers three hazard mitigation grant programs; the Hazard Mitigation
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Grant Program (HMGP) which provides post-disaster mitigation grants to communities
impacted by disaster, the Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities (BRIC) program
providing annual competitive grants for all natural hazards, and the Flood Mitigation
Assistance (FMA) program, which, through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),
provides mitigation funding to reduce flooding (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
2020). These programs emerged from decades of policy evolution. Despite the widespread
availability of federal funding in the United States (Ji & Lee, 2019), many communities fail
to implement resilience and hazard mitigation programs, thus failing to reduce overall
disaster risk for the citizens in the communities (Blackman et al., 2017).
Research Question
This study answers the following research question: what factors influence hazard
mitigation governance in states within FEMA Region III. Specifically, the population for this
study was Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington D.C., the states
within FEMA Region III. This research explored the governance challenges facing
communities across the United States with the intent of lowering the barriers to reducing
disasters. This research has both policy and practical implications. Lawmakers and
administrators can use this research to make changes to enhance existing law and policy and
construct new policy. In addition, practitioners in communities may use this research to
better implement hazard mitigation programs in an effort to break the cycle of disaster.
Significance of the Research Question
The world is at a tipping point; more frequent and stronger disasters coupled with
mounting economic losses from climate changed fueled disasters (World Meteorological
Organization, 2021)) necessitate drastic action on disaster risk reduction activities. While
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resources and funding are available to implement projects, communities often fail to make
transformative risk-reduction change (Blackman et al., 2017). This study identified the
governance factors that either enable or inhibit communities from widespread action on
disaster risk reduction.
This study is significant for several reasons. First, emergency management
practitioners who lead hazard mitigation programs can use this study to develop stronger and
more effective programs. By understanding the pain points or barriers to implementation,
they are able to more effectively make progress in reducing disaster risk. Next, agencies and
organizations that administer hazard mitigation grants can use these findings to design
programs that provide resources to those in greatest need. Finally, the study contributes
broadly to the academic body of knowledge. There are some studies that focus on
communities within FEMA Region III (e.g., Baja, 2015), but the majority focus on states in
the southeast U.S. (e.g., Joyner & Orgera 2014; Houck, 1985; Stults, 2017).
Theory
This study leveraged an interpretive framework to answer the research question. This
approach assumed that understanding a topic requires a deep understanding and the
interaction between humans and objects derives meaning (Hesse-Biber, 2017). Specifically,
the study used the evolved version of grounded theory. Grounded theory is an approach that
allows for conditions impacting the research question to emerge in the analysis phase, while
first conducting a literature review (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The study’s evolved grounded
theory approach allowed the researcher to conduct preliminary analysis of the research
question, while staying open for new theory to emerge during the data analysis process.
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Related to the research question, scholars suggest that community participation and
hazard awareness (Godschalk et al. 2003; Stevens et al. 2010), organizational capacity
(Brody et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2013), networks (Djanlnte et al., 2011; Muller & Yin, 2010),
and collaborative governance (Malekpour et al., 2021) influence community implementation
of hazard mitigation projects. The review of the research showed there is not one
predominant factor impacting the research question. Other governance issues may influence
the research question including the structure of communities, overly complex grant
requirements, a lack of creativity to pursue funding outside FEMA grants, or a poor benefit
cost analysis. While the literature does suggest these conditions, and other conditions may
exist, as noted the study was designed deliberately to let the conditions emerge while
collecting data.
Approach
To answer the research question, this study used qualitative methods. This topic is
complex, requiring the thick and rich data produced from a qualitative approach to
adequately answer the question (Hesse-Biber, 2007). Qualitative methods also approach a
research topic from the emic perspective, accounting for the unique cultural and lived
experiences of subjects (Yin, 2016), telling a story through the eyes of the participant (Willis,
2007). Given these factors, qualitative methods were the appropriate approach for the study.
This study sampled State Hazard Mitigation Officers (SHMO) in state emergency
management agencies. These individuals administer federal hazard mitigation grants and also
create programs that support local implementation of mitigation actions. Their unique
knowledge and understanding of the communities in their state provided the appropriate level
of context needed for the study. The SHMOs are experts in hazard mitigation both in terms
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of the programs they administer as well as the needs of the local communities they support.
The specific sample of the study was states within FEMA Region III, which included
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
This population and participant pool was accessible to the researcher given the proximity of
these states to West Chester University and the researcher’s familiarity with FEMA Region
III. The participants also are experts in hazard mitigation program administration, making
them the correct participants for this study.
This study used semi-structured interviews. Each interview lasted approximately one
hour, during which time the researcher led the participant through an interview guide
designed to guide the conversation. The interview guide allowed sufficient flexibility to
capture emerging themes during the interview. Upon completion of data collection, the
researcher transcribed the six interviews and used coding as the data analysis approach.
This research is significant, and is applicable to both public administrators as well as
emergency management practitioners. The research design is replicable to other regions
throughout the nation and can improve administration of hazard mitigation programs. While
past research on the topic has addressed governance issues in hazard mitigation (e.g. Smith &
Vila, 2020), these studies did not address issues specific to one FEMA region. This research
is organized in to five chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, Research Framework and
Methods, Results and Discussion, and Conclusion.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
This literature review consists of three sections. First, the grounding theory of
governance is explored both in general and within the context of hazard mitigation. Next, to
fully understand the federal mitigation programs that state and local agencies use, one must
understand how federal mitigation policy has evolved and how it interacts with state and
local policy. Finally, the literature review concludes with exploration into the conditions that
impact the research question, what are the factors that influence hazard mitigation
governance?
Conceptual Framework – Governance
Governance relates to the activities that public administrators take to steer
government to implement its goals. Achieved through developing and executing a series of
tasks, governance involves both the work of government as well as a supporting role of the
private sector and other non-governmental organizations. In the course of governance, the
public also influences the process by providing direct feedback about the effectiveness of
governance. At the most basic level governance refers to the activities taken to achieve a
desired goal or outcome. Specifically, components of governance include the systems,
hierarchies, and networks that achieve the desired outcomes (Peters, 2012).
Researchers have studied issues of governance in hazard mitigation programs.
Scolobig et al. (2014) outlined several components of hazard mitigation governance
including the stakeholders, decision support tools, and coordination required to adopt hazard
mitigation measures. Their key finding was that community participation was a critical
component of good hazard mitigation governance. Muller & Yin (2010) identified the
importance of regional governance structures to mitigation hazards, given the regional nature
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of disaster risk. Finally, Smith and Vila (2020) note the importance of local capacity for the
governance of hazard mitigation programs.
Government has a responsibility to define and protect the public interest. In this role
they give voice to the voiceless through governance actions and through implementation of
policy. Accompanying this responsibility is a long-term stewardship role, aimed at protecting
the interests of future generations (Meredith et al., 2016). The long-term impacts of hazard
mitigation projects are significant. Officials estimate that every $1 investment in hazard
mitigation projects produces a $6 savings on response and recovery costs (National Institute
of Building Sciences, 2019). These decisions can change the face of communities and protect
future generations.
While approaches have varied, the general hierarchy in government has remained
somewhat steady since World War II. In this period the federal government largely managed
its policy priorities through top-down control of state and local organizations through
conditions attached to funding, grants, and other mechanisms (Kettl, 2015). This approach
has proved effective in the areas of managed urban renewal, highway systems, and several
welfare programs (Kettl, 2015). This governance approach has implications for hierarchy in
government and challenges the fundamental stratification of power at various levels of
government.
Good governance results from a shared sense of responsibility and cooperation across
levels of government (Shin, 2018). The relationships as well as the governance goals
between the levels of government have evolved over time. Whether it be the top-down
approaches of Alexander Hamilton, the bottom-up approach of Thomas Jefferson, the
centered approach of Woodrow Wilson, or the balanced approach from James Madison,
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governance approaches are not static (Kettl, 2015). Good governance is the cornerstone of
the modern state (Addink, 2019), and has positive effects on the wellbeing of community
members (Dutt, 2018).
Governance is a challenge in a modern society with complex problems. Increasingly
the federal government is intervening to address massive challenges facing the nation (e.g.,
healthcare) in an effort to provide a baseline of services (Kettl, 2015). Viewed by some as a
massive takeover, the debate continues about where governance power should reside and
which level of government should wield it (Kettl, 2015). While the federal government
continues to increase its power in directing governance, local and state governments and
private organizations are tasked with administering programs locally. This creates a complex
web of overlapping responsibilities (Kettl, 2015).
For hazard mitigation programs, governance is a shared responsibility between local,
state, and federal entities. Local agencies are responsible for executing mitigation projects,
supported by guidance of state officials, using federal dollars. Local and state officials
receive management costs to build capacity to execute projects to fund staff or contractors to
manage projects. Despite local implementation of hazard mitigation, the federal government
implements their priorities by determining project eligibility (Smith & Vila, 2020).
Governance is also faced with public scrutiny, which means that failures are often
highly visible with little tolerance for underperformance. Known as the Katrina Syndrome,
catastrophic public failures erode trust in government, leading to a sense of urgency for rapid
policy change (Kettl, 2015). The Katrina Syndrome is not a new phenomenon, rather, public
backlash for governance failures has occurred for decades (Long, 1949). When government
is working well, however, there’s little praise from the public. Thus, governments are
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motivated by fear of failure rather than developing good policy (Kettl, 2015). As such,
investing in policy such as hazard mitigation is not a priority. Not only is the public
generally unaware but also the benefits of these policies far transcend one administration,
often not making impacts for generations to come. This is unfortunate, given the importance
of stakeholder engagement for governance activities in an ever increasing information age.
With more access to information the public’s expectations for government performance have
increased, yet, this gap exists (Meredith et al., 2016).
In addition to the gap between the public and government, there is an increasing gap
between policymakers and administrators executing policy. This disconnect is most apparent
when policies stumble or fail, given the public attention lavished on the failures. While this is
often not an intentional act, there is an increasing need to adequately frame problems in ways
that produce quality policy (Kettl, 2015). Governance is critically important for society to
function but is not evenly distributed across society. Often the communities that require
governance the most are those which are least capable to effectuate good governance. In
other words, governance is for everyone, but not everyone can achieve governance (Peters,
2012).
Hazard Mitigation Policy – Overview & Evolution
The current state of hazard mitigation governance is a result of numerous policy and
governance changes. These changes are a result, in most cases, by legislative action at the
federal level. The following section presents the major milestones of hazard mitigation policy
in the United States. This section provides important contextual information to inform the
current state of hazard mitigation programs. Since the majority of hazard mitigation funding
originates from the federal government, an understanding of key milestones in mitigation
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policy is critical in understanding how state and local agencies implement mitigation
programs.
Federal Mitigation Policy
Like issues of governance, federal hazard mitigation policy has evolved over time.
This evolution reflects changing approaches and attitudes towards mitigation and often
results from catastrophic disasters (Birkland, 1998, Godschalk, 2005). Much of the federal
approach to hazard mitigation focuses on all-hazards, however, several hazard-specific
programs do exist which provide resources for a narrow set of eligible activities. An
understanding of the past is important in informing the current state of hazard mitigation
programs.
The current landscape of federal hazard mitigation programs is one largely based on
reactionary policy. Major disasters tend to prompt policy change and funding for local
mitigation projects often results from these changes. For example, the most recent policy
overhaul, the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, came after the devastating 2017 hurricane
season. In this year, three major hurricanes, Harvey, Irma, and Maria, impacted parts of the
continental United States, United States Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico (Webster et al.,
2021). While FEMA’s role in modern centralized mitigation policy began in 1979 with the
formation of the agency, scholars trace the roots of policy back to the 1800s and the
involvement of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in flood studies in the Midwest
(Godschalk, 2005).
Although the Flood Control Act of 1917 was the first legislative action that
contributed to federal disaster policy it was not until the 1930’s when the federal government
began to take a larger role in disaster management and hazard mitigation. During this period,
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the federal government provided disaster aid on a case-by-case basis, and funding for any
kind of aid required passage of legislation. One turning point for federal disaster management
policy occurred in 1950 with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act (Godschalk, 2005). While
this Act signaled the start of an organized role for the federal government, it focused on
response and recovery to disaster rather than providing funding for hazard mitigation. The
Disaster Relief Act became the dominant mitigation policy mechanism for the federal
government. Later amended in 1953, in 1970, and again in 1974, the Act continued to focus
on response policy and support to state and local governments after a disaster (Godschalk,
2005).
Once again in 1968, in response to a catastrophic disaster, Congress created the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP was the policy outcome of a
Presidential Task Force on Federal Flood Control (Platt, 1996). The NFIP’s two main
objectives are to offer flood insurance to properties located in high-risk areas and to reduce
floodplain risk through the implementation of hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction
actions (Congressional Research Service, 2020). A significant outcome of the NFIP is the
Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program would come later in 1994 (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2019). FMA is one of three modern federal mitigation programs that
support local and state flood reduction projects. FMA leverages NFIP premium revenue to
fund eligible mitigation projects (Congressional Research Service, 2020). The important
legacy of the NFIP cannot be overstated given its influence on housing and development
trends, since 1968 the program has survived and more importantly is a modern mitigation
policy tool. Over the years the NFIP has been amended numerous times, most recently in
2012 with the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act. This Act made structural
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changes to the NFIP, adjusting premiums in an effort to make the program soluble (Joyner &
Orgera, 2014). Another watershed policy moment occurred with the creation of the FEMA.
In an effort to streamline an otherwise fragmented approach to disaster policy,
President Carter created FEMA in 1979. This action collapsed five existing federal programs
into one agency charged with the coordination of disasters response in the United States.
While this fusion of existing programs into one agency created some tension with overall
agency mission and focus, it laid the groundwork for future action on hazard mitigation
(Godschalk, 2005). It would be nearly 20 years before the nation’s next comprehensive
revision of emergency management policy would occur.
The next significant milestone for hazard mitigation was the passage of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief Act in 1988. While the Act primarily focused on response and
recovery activities, hazard mitigation was also a policy outcome. Of significance, the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides funding directly to communities impacted by
disaster to implement mitigation actions. This program provides 75% federal funding (up to
90% in some circumstances) for eligible projects (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
2020a). This program is significant, standing the test of time through a series of additional
federal hazard mitigation policy evolutions. It is one of the current funding mechanisms
FEMA uses to influence local mitigation policy (Keegan, 2009).
While federal mitigation policy languished given the focus on response and recovery,
the 1990s saw a rapid prioritization of mitigation funding under the Clinton Administration.
In 1993 FEMA established the mitigation directorate, devoted solely to reducing disaster
risk. This move coincided with other popular policy changes including publication of the first
National Mitigation Strategy in 1995 (Goodschalk, 2005).
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Mitigation policy took a prominent role during the tenure of FEMA Administrator
James Lee Witt. In 1996 FEMA began Project Impact, an initiative that provided seed money
to communities to implement grass-roots mitigation projects. The idea, pair public money
with private local investment in mitigation, proved incredibly successful and Project Impact
sites emerged all over the nation. By coupling funding with enthusiasm from local
organizations, Project Impact made a significant impact in cities across the nation
(Armstrong, 2000). Despite the success of the popular program, the Bush Administration
promptly cancelled the program shortly after taking office (Holdeman & Patton, 2008).
In response to criticism of a fragmented and inefficient federal policy approach to
mitigation, Congress enacted the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000. The DMA
streamlined existing federal policy and prompted state and local communities to develop
hazard mitigation plans in order to remain eligible for FEMA hazard mitigation grants and
changed the way in which the federal government prioritized mitigation funding and
implemented federal policies at the state and local level (Berke et al., 2014).
One of the outcomes of Project Impact that was codified in law however was
FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program. PDM provided nationwide competitive
mitigation grants to eligible mitigation projects. This program, along with HMGP and FMA,
were the primary mechanisms for federal mitigation policy for nearly 20 years (McCarthy &
Keegan, 2009). Eventually, the PDM program gave way to the Building Resilient
Infrastructure Communities (BRIC) program which was the first major mitigation policy
shift since the DMA 2000 (Holdeman, 2019).
The passage of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) in 2018 signaled a
commitment to reducing disaster risk and breaking the cycle of disaster. Resulting from the
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significant 2017 hurricane and wildfire seasons, DRRA amended the Stafford Act, adding
additional provisions related to streamlining recovery process and more importantly
prioritizing investment in pre-disaster mitigation. Specifically, Section 1235 amended CRF
Section 404a to expand eligibility and funding for mitigation and resilience actions. In
addition, DRRA Section 1234 allows for the President to make up to six percent of the
previous year’s disaster losses available for hazard mitigation by transferring that amount
from the Disaster Relief Fund into FEMA appropriations (Webster & Lindsay, 2018).
FEMA’s Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities (BRIC) program was the result of
the translation from the DRRA legislation to program.
In fiscal year 2020 FEMA introduced the BRIC program in response to DRRA.
BRIC, the successor to PDM, is available to any state that has received a Presidential Major
Disaster Declaration in the past seven years. FEMA anticipates funding levels of $300-$500
million annually, however the White House determines the exact funding level. As an
example, there was $962 million available in FY2020 and yet the program was funded at
$500 million for that year (Webster et al., 2021). This funding pales in comparison to the
need. In 2017 FEMA distributed $5 billion in HMGP funding to states affected by disasters.
There is room for the fund to grow substantially based upon future disaster loss (Horn,
2020).
BRIC prioritizes infrastructure projects that address core lifeline functions and those
that incorporate nature-based solutions. In addition, the program incentivizes communities
that adopt building codes aimed at reducing disaster risk (Horn, 2020). The program also
includes a state-specific set-aside, designed to address issues of community & capacity
building, to include planning and project scope activities (Federal Emergency Management
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Agency, 2021a). While the program is in its infancy, it provides the framework for
significant future investment in hazard mitigation and risk reduction measures in the US.
Outside FEMA-administered programs, several other federal agencies provide hazard
mitigation related grants. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) administers the Community Development Block Grant-Mitigation program for
certain eligible communities impacted by disaster (Housing and Urban Development, 2021).
The United States Economic Development Administration (EDA) also administers recovery
grants that applicants can use for hazard mitigation projects. Like HUD mitigation funding,
the EDA grants become available post-disaster, for communities that are impacted by
significant disasters (United States Economic Development Administration, 2021).
State Mitigation Policy
While the federal government is inherently motivated to encourage local mitigation
action (Berke et al., 2014) state governments also enact mitigation policy. While research
suggests that state regulation has limited impact on local mitigation due to the strength of
local law (Deyle et al., 2008), numerous states have acted. States play a critical role in
carrying out federal priorities (e.g., through administering HMA programs) and provide
innovative resources to assist locals. Across the United States, the role of states varies greatly
based on factors such as policy approach, distribution of authority between state and locals,
and ability to provide direct technical assistance. Researchers have noted the impacts that
state policy have on local execution of hazard mitigation programs (Berke et al., 2014).
Finally, state emergency management agencies play a critical role in capacity building at the
local level, thus creating the condition for local execution of mitigation actions (Smith et al.,
2013).
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One way that states enable local hazard mitigation project implementation is through their
development of state-level hazard mitigation plans. For example, Maryland recently updated
the Maryland State Hazard Mitigation Plan to include updated risk information and a new set
of state priorities for hazard mitigation. The plan outlines the long-term strategy for reducing
disaster risk in Maryland, and is a requirement for the state to receive hazard mitigation
assistance (Humphrey, 2020).
Local Mitigation Policy
Local communities are on the front lines of executing hazard mitigation policy. These
communities employ a set of non-structural and structural projects. Nonstructural techniques
include implementing projects such as building standards, development regulations, land and
property acquisition, taxation/fiscal policy, and information distribution (Olshansky &
Kartez, 1998). Land use regulations restricting development in hazardous areas (e.g., coastal
areas) are an effective mitigation action that local communities implement. These actions
however are often less desirable given economic pressures often limit these actions (Burby &
May, 1997). Instead, communities tend to implement tangible structural mitigation projects
that present with less controversy (Berke et al., 2014). On the other hand, structural
mitigation projects seek to strengthen buildings and keep hazards away from people. These
projects involve protecting critical systems and making physical improvements to
communities. Examples of structural mitigation actions include constructing levees, dams,
channels or retrofitting buildings to better withstand hazards (Mileti, 1999). Local officials
drive mitigation action. This is no more evident than in Baltimore City where local officials
implemented bottom-up resilience projects to equitably reduce disaster risk and prepare for
the impacts of climate change (Baja, 2015).
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An example of an innovative local hazard mitigation project is the South Baltimore
Wetlands Project, which received $32 million in funding through FEMA’s BRIC program in
2021. The project entails implementing a nature-based flood protection through the
restoration of wetlands in the Baltimore community. This project was funded alongside $377
million in nationally competitive BRIC awards, and will create long-term solution to
flooding in South Baltimore (Dance, 2021).
Conditions Impacting the Research Question
The current approach to nationwide hazard mitigation, largely driven by federal
grants and executed locally, has failed to incentivize and create the necessary conditions for
state and local agencies to reduce disaster risk. This is an issue of governance and the
literature suggests four conditions that impact program delivery. This section explores the
conditions of community participation, organizational capacity, networks, and collaborative
governance.
Community Participation & Hazard Awareness
Citizen participation in government programs and services has increasingly become a
focus as public administrators work to improve the governance activities of government
agencies. Broadly speaking, citizen engagement and participation refers to interaction of the
public and government in policy, programs, and governance (Afonso, 2017). Public
engagement can spur new ideas, promote social justice, and improve government process
(Nabatchi, 2010; Bryson et al., 2013).
In the information age, citizens have much more access to help steer the direction of
government. In order for policy and governance to be effective, those who are most impacted
by the decisions of government need to have a role in the process. Unlike the past, large
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numbers of people are empowered by information, and thus have a desire to be part of the
governance process (Cleaveland, 1985).
Participation itself can take various forms. It can take the form of one-way
communication where government shares information with the public (Afonso, 2017).
Consultation, or two-way dialogue on issues, is another form of citizen participation (Berner
et al., 2011). In active participation, citizens shape the governance process, providing direct
input into the actions of government (Afonso, 2017). When executed correctly, active
participation allows government to operate directly in the interest of citizens (Berner et al.,
2017). For hazard mitigation programs, community participation is required in some
instances such as the hazard mitigation planning process (Humphrey, 2020) as well as in
project development and execution (Dance, 2021). Finally, direct participation shifts the
power of decisions to the public. Whereas in active participation the government is still the
ultimate decision maker, direct participation relegates final decisions to the public (Roberts,
2004).
Powerful citizens have significant influence, even control, over governance. Arnstein
(1969) outlines an eight rung ladder where citizens move from the most basic levels of nonparticipation towards complete control of governance processes at the top of the ladder.
Arnstein contents that citizen engagement is a redistribution of power and that citizens
groups can have significant influence over policy, thus being able to realize their community
goals. In this model the redistribution of power from government to citizens is important in
achieving successful communities (Arnstein, 1969).
Inclusiveness in the governance process has led scholars to call for a participatory
process for hazard and risk identification (Boulder et al., 2009). Whereas a classic risk
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management view assumes that the public’s subjective opinion of risk should not be included
in policy formulation (Armendola, 2007), a more recent positivist view has emerged which
values public input into the governance process for risk reduction related programs (Dietz et
al., 1993). Despite this viewpoint which values public input, public administrators have
difficulty involving the public in the process.
Simply stated, communities are not interested and/or aware of hazard mitigation
programs and the hazards they face. This is a significant barrier to implementing widespread
mitigation actions (Mileti, 1999). Several scholars suggest the lack of community interest and
participation in the process is a condition that prevents widespread local mitigation
action. Godshalk et al. (2003) found that citizen engagement on issues related to hazards,
risk, and mitigation was low regardless of the size or hazards a community face. They
recommended connecting mitigation to quality-of-life concerns and taking a bottom-up
approach to mitigation. Similarly, Stevens et al. (2010) found that community interest in
hazard mitigation was relatively low.
Despite relatively low level of community awareness of hazard, researchers have
found that a participatory process, rather than a top-down approach to hazards analysis,
produces better outcomes (Fussel, 2006). Greater participation in the hazard analysis and
project development process was shown to foster better outcomes (Ravera & Tarrason,
2011). It seems that participation in the vulnerability assessment process is an important
concept for governance (Rossingnol et al., 2015) and thus, communities where the public
does not participate in the process likely have less desirable hazard mitigation outcomes. As
mentioned previously, community participation is a requirement for hazard mitigation
planning (Humphrey, 2020).
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Past disaster experience impacts risk perception. Demuth et al. (2016) found that past
disaster experience does shape individual perceptions about hazard impact and severity.
Experience informs future actions related to risk and can drive individual behavior either in
positive or negative ways. This is similar to Huang et al. (2012) which found that past
disaster experience informs risk perception. As a condition of this study, risk perception may
lead to greater community interest in hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction actions,
thus, improving governance of hazard mitigation programs.
Organizational Capacity
Organizational capacity refers to several factors that impact an organization’s
capability for governance. While consensus does not necessarily exist within the literature,
the common elements of organizational capacity include funding, technical expertise of staff,
leadership, communication, and the ability to anticipate strategic issues (Hartvelt & Okun
1991; Grindle & Hilderbrand 1995; Hartig et al. 1995). More broadly, organizational
capacity includes the ability of individuals within an organization to come together to
achieve a common goal (Brody et al. 2008).
Organizational capacity for public and nonprofit organizations has grown in
importance and is an indicator of a highly functioning organization (Blumenthal, 2003).
Capacity is important in carrying out an agency’s mission as well as individual projects.
Researchers continue to seek ways to measure and improve organizational capacity
(Blumenthal, 2003). Capacity, in this light, is not seen as a static component, rather, it
evolves over the lifespan of an organization. The goal in improving organizational capacity is
ultimately improving efficiency (Morgan, 1986) in order to achieve the organization’s goals
(Letts et al., 1999).
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Limitations in organizational capacity are a common theme of many public
organizations. De Vita et al. (2001) found that many small rural organizations lack the ability
to meet increased demand for services. This is also consistent with Letts et al. (1997) who
outline the challenges of public and non-profit organizations have in carrying out programs
and services. Overall, the literature suggests that organizational capacity is a key factor in
agencies achieving goals and carrying out services (Zhang et al., 2017).
The concepts of organizational capacity are interrelated and significant when
communities obtain funding for mitigation projects. Technical expertise and highly skilled
engineering work are factors that lead to successful hazard mitigation projects (Olshansky
& Kartez 1998). The higher technical expertise and planning ability the more likely an
organization is to achieve positive outcomes in mitigation (Olshansky &Kartez 1998; Brody
2003; Laurian et al. 2004).
Local organizations can receive assistance and training to increase technical
expertise. Many states provide technical assistance in the form of training or direct staffing;
however, this is not a normal occurrence since many states themselves are without sufficient
resources or staff to execute projects. In addition, since states typically administer FEMA
grant programs, direct technical assistance to local organizations may invoke concerns of
conflict of interest (Smith et al., 2013).
Executing complex hazard mitigation projects also requires expertise in the form of
project management skills. Project managers carry out the tasks associated with complex
projects from start to finish. These staff manage high-levels of administrative work keeping
project teams organized and on track, and working across agencies to complete tasks. Project
management in itself is a field of study, thus demonstrating the complexity of the position
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(Van der Waldt, 2019). Individuals experienced and qualified to manage hazard mitigation
projects from start to finish are often lacking, especially in small organizations.
Related to the staff of an organization, the level of commitment towards projects is a
factor which influences overall organizational capacity. Researchers have demonstrated the
failures associated with a lack of commitment on the part of staff in executing public policy
(Handmer, 1996). Related specifically to hazard mitigation, a commitment to addressing
the hazards a community faces have been shown as an important factor success (Dalton
& Burby 1994; Berke, 1996; Burby et al. 1997).
Leadership within an organization also impacts commitment. Transformational
leaders who mentor staff bring about organizational change and build the capacity within an
organization. The efforts of these individuals increase internal commitment to programs and
ultimately improve the organization’s capacity (Kotter, 1995).
Russell Strickland, Acting Secretary of the Maryland Department of Emergency
Management and Chair of the National Emergency Management Association Resilience
Committee, has led a nationwide push to prioritize hazard mitigation. Through his coined
phrase “mitigation is the center of the universe,” he has raised awareness and pressured
federal lawmakers to prioritize mitigation funding and policy change (Berger, 2021). His
efforts illustrate how transformational leaders can lead change and influence policy.
A lack of external commitment to an organization also impacts their ability to execute
their mission. Local political support plays an important role in both funding organizations
and supporting the projects which they pursue (Baglioni & Vicari, 1995). External mandates
also affect the extent to which staff are committed to a project. Dalton and Burby (1994)
found that political commitment to an organization or mandates made it more likely the
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organization would comply and thus perform the task as effectively as possible. It seems that
commitment, as a component of organizational capacity, is an important predictor of
success.
Funding in an organization is also a component of organizational capacity that
influences mitigation project outcomes. Organizations with higher levels of funding can
invest in engineering work which is a pre-requisite for many large-scale structural projects
(Brody et al., 2008). While FEMA provides mitigation funding through the various grant
programs discussed earlier, these programs come with a non-federal cash match (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2020) which is a further organizational challenge for
communities that lack sufficient local mitigation funding (Frazier et al., 2013). While some
states do offset the non-federal cash match for these mitigation programs, it is certainly not
required or standard practice (Smith et al., 2013). Funding is also severely lacking for the
mitigation programs that FEMA administers. While federal grants provide funds, the demand
for mitigation funding far outpaces available federal funds (McCarthy & Keegan, 2009). For
example, in 2021 the Maryland Department of Emergency Management received over $300
million in funding requests for an available $93 million in HMGP funds (Tate, 2021), and in
2020 FEMA received roughly $4 billion in BRIC funding requests for an available $500
million in funding (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2021d).
Despite consensus on the importance of organizational capacity for hazard mitigation,
Smith et al. (2013) found that state emergency management agencies believe that most local
communities lack the capacity to plan for or execute mitigation actions. This suggests that
the organizations primarily tasked with executing hazard mitigation projects are unable to do
so due to a lack of organizational capacity.
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Networks
Disaster vulnerability issues are inherently complex (Blackman et al., 2017) requiring
a network approach to address risk through hazard mitigation (Brody 2008). This is not
surprising considering the complex networks that local emergency management agencies find
themselves in (Waugh, 1994). This is another area where direct research linking mitigation
and networks exists.
Agranoff and Mcguire (2003) define networks as multi-organizational arrangements
that are used to solve problems. While networks play a prominent role in policy development
and administration, they seldom replace the formal hierarchical structures of organizations.
What networks do allow for is the execution of complex tasks for organizations with limited
resources or expertise. A shift has also occurred whereby problems have become wicked and
interconnected. Networks enable organizations to share ideas, information, and explore
solutions to problems (Argranoff, 2007). McGuire and Silva (2010) highlight the importance
of networks within emergency management agencies. Agencies use networks to solve the
complex problems, including those related to hazard mitigation that emergency managers
face on a daily basis.
Networks differ in terms of their complexity and the type of information or resources
exchanged. Information and development networks are rather primitive, exchanging ideas
and expertise. More complex, outreach and action networks share resources, jointly obtain
funding, and engage in policy development and execution (Argranoff, 2007). Regardless of
how advanced a network is, emergency managers leverage networks in execution of their
missions.
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Networks are important in the context of implementing complex mitigation and
disaster risk reduction programs. Djannte et al. (2011) found that networks were important in
organizational self-learning for implementation of risk reduction programs. This essentially
means that organizations are able to improve their organizational capacity to complete
mitigation actions by leveraging a networked approach to governance. The highest
functioning networks include a diverse set of stakeholders that span government, non-profit,
and private sector organizations (Djanlnte, 2012). Networks are effective at improving
capacity for risk reduction actions given their flexible nature. This results from the informal,
self-organized nature of disaster risk reduction networks. The strength in networks results
from collective inputs from member organizations (Folke et al., 2005).
Within the context of networks, regional governance organizations impact hazard
mitigation implementation. Given that issues of hazard vulnerability do not typically follow
jurisdictional boundaries (Muller & Yin, 2010), regional governance is the preferred method
for addressing complex spillover problems (Konoshima et al., 2008). In essence, a failure of
one system has multiple cascading impacts across multiple communities. Councils of
government and other regional governance models aid in reducing disaster risk for complex
hazards that affect multiple communities (Muller & Yin, 2010). From the standpoint of
limited organizational capacity, this makes sense as organizations are able to leverage the
collective expertise of network members to achieve broader goals.
The increasing complexity of threats and hazards necessitates the leveraging of
networks. Similar to the findings of Muller and Yin (2010), Termeer et al. (2017) speak to
the importance of multijurisdictional efforts to address threats and hazards through the use of
a joined-up government and network governance approach for disaster risk management. Li
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et al. (2020) also address the importance of networks in the coordination and execution of
effective resilience planning and execution. Networks such as these aid in addressing the
complex resilience issues related to climate change and the increased severity of disasters
(Stark, 2014). Limited organizational resources to address resilience is often the driver of a
networked approach to hazard reduction (Grothmann & Patt, 2005).
Alternative Models of Governance
Related closely to network governance are the principles of New Public Management
(NPM) & New Public Service (NPS), that is, a decentralized approach to governance (Eakin
et al., 2011). Alternative models of governance address the flexibility organizations need to
reduce disaster risk. Traditional hierarchical bureaucratic structures are incompatible with the
requirements placed upon organizations charged with addressing complex risk reduction
issues. Instead, the principle of flexibility, achieved through network governance, allows
organizations to innovate to address the complexity of disaster risk (Kоzakov et al., 2021).
Traditional public administration, now commonly known as Old Public
Administration, refers to the traditional ways in which governments function and how
administrators provided services to citizens. This approach assumes that only laws and rules
govern public managers, that hierarchy reigns supreme, and predictability, consistency, and
accountability are key components (Olsen, 2003). In this approach, the public administrator
plays little to no role in policymaking and governance; rather, they simply carry out the tasks
assigned by elected officials (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011).
Emerging in the 1980s & 1990s, NPM refers to practices that seek to use privatesector approaches in government (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). A common theme of this
approach is the use of market-based techniques and mechanisms to operate public
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organizations. In addition, a key principle is using market-based competition to drive
efficiency and improve service delivery (Kettl, 2015). The approach seeks
to dismantle traditional administrative safeguards in lieu of market mechanisms that in theory
will protect the organization (Hood, 1995).
Building on the changes of NPM but pivoting back a bit towards the values
of democracy and public interest, NPS is another alternative administrative model. Rather
than a focus on clients (Old Public Administration) or customers (New Public Management),
NPS focuses on the citizen. NPS does feature some elements of NPM such as decentralized
bureaucracy and alternative delivery models; however, the model is slightly different
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). The key here is rather than relying solely on private
companies to deliver services, the focus of all activities is the citizen and meeting their
needs and doing so in a manner that is consistent with the values of public
service (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011).
In an environment with increasing complexity and one in which featuring wicked
problems (Agranoff, 2007), hazard mitigation administrators must carefully consider
governance structures in execution of projects. NPM and NPS offer alternative governance
models which may influence hazard mitigation governance. As noted earlier, citizen
engagement in project execution is important in execution of community projects (Dance,
2021). As the federal government prioritizes equity and citizen-focus through the Justice40
Initiative (Young et al., 2021), citizen focus will become increasingly important in hazard
mitigation governance.
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Collaborative Governance
Across the nation the demand for collaborative governance, that is, problem solving
across agencies in communities to solve complex problems, is on the rise. Wicked problems
and the context by which the public demands resolution are driving the need for collaborative
governance. The interconnectedness of our modern communities demands more than just a
single agency governmental solution (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Researchers believe that
cross-sector collaboration is more important than ever in today’s interconnected world
(Bryson et al., 2006).
Solving problems with collaborative governance, by its nature, is complex. The
dynamics of interpersonal relationships are a factor that influences the effectiveness of
collaborative government regimes. When successfully implemented, these relationships are
leveraged for complex problem solving. Collaborative governance regimes are successful
when they include a diverse set of views and ideas (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Issues
related to hazard mitigation are by their very nature complex and interconnected.
Administrators leverage collaboration to solve these complex problems.
Several factors influence the success of collaborative governance regimes. These
include developing relationships with stakeholders (Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2015),
fostering shared ownership of outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008), establishing a shared sense
of purpose (Malekpour et al., 2017), and achieving small wins in an effort to build
momentum (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Building enough flexibility into the process is also cited
as an important factor for collaborative governance success (Rijke et al., 2013).
Flexibility, as a factor for success, is a critical element of success for collaborative
governance initiatives. Polycentric systems (Ostrom, 2010), feature multiple independent, yet
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coordinated centers of decision making. This construct provides the sufficient control, yet
flexibility to spur innovation to address complex challenges related to climate change (PahlWostl et al., 2012). Hazard mitigation issues are sufficiently complex which requires
flexibility and innovation to implement.
Successful implementation of hazard mitigation programs also relies upon the
collaborations within a community. Emergency managers and organizations that lead hazard
mitigation programs are collaborators in nature. Complex projects span multiple agencies and
are based on solutions which require the buy in of multiple agencies. Stakeholders bring their
unique knowledge and technical expertise to bear as communities attempt to address the
complexities of hazard. Agencies that successfully leverage principles of collaborative
governance are likely to succeed in hazard mitigation projects (Brody, 2003; Innes 1996).
Communities also implement collaborative governance for nature-based solutions to
resilience issues. Nature-based solutions are inherently complex, requiring a multitude of
actors collectively addressing the interdependencies of resilience issues (Pickett et al., 2013).
These collaborations have been deliberate, engaged subject matter experts on the topic, and
led to successful outcomes. While communities have successfully applied collaborative
governance to issues of resilience and risk reduction, the principles of the approach are
universally applied across any subject matter (Malekpour et al., 2021).
An important community partner is the private sector. Public organizations that
leverage the expertise of private sector organizations through collaborative governance
perform better, achieving better outcomes through shared program delivery. Successful
public-private partnerships, however, require a careful balance of engagement between
public and private entities. When implemented successfully, public-private partnerships solve
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public problems more completely and efficiently than government alone. These collaborative
partnerships also enable completion of extra projects through a division of labor while
governmental agencies can concentrate on core services (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2012).
FEMA encourages collaboration with the private sector. The FY2020 BRIC program
awarded communities for innovate strategies that involved a variety of partners across the
community including private sector partners. The scoring criteria in the grant program,
FEMA emphasized the importance of working with private sector organization to capitalize
funds provided by the federal government through matching private sector contributions
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2020).
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Chapter III: Research Methods
Overview
This research sought to understand the conditions that influence the adoption of
hazard mitigation programs and projects throughout states within FEMA Region III. The
findings of this study may shape public policy and governance processes for communities
that reduce disaster risk through hazard mitigation actions. The study also informs the
academic body of knowledge for future inquiry.
The following section describes the methods this study used to answer the research
question. The study used a qualitative research approach, explicitly using the in-depth
interviewing method (Hesse-Biber, 2017). The interview questions were semi-structured to
allow the conversation to evolve as needed. The sample was purposeful, interviewing the six
State Hazard Mitigation Officers in FEMA’s Region III states. This design included an
evolved grounded theory approach. The evolved grounded theory approach encourages the
researcher to proactively engage the literature prior to data collection. Evolved grounded
theory increases theoretical sensitivity, providing a base of knowledge for the researcher
prior to data collection. (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).The following chapter provides detailed
information on these and other critical elements of the research design.
Research Question
As stated in earlier chapters, the research question was: what factors influence
hazard mitigation governance in states within FEMA Region III? This research question
sought to understand the fundamental factors that enable communities to adopt hazard
mitigation projects or inhibit widespread adoption of projects. With climate change
impacting disasters in communities across the nation, effective governance of hazard
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mitigation programs is increasingly important. Federal and state agencies that provide local
funding for mitigation need to develop programs that create the conditions for success for
community-based hazard mitigation success.
Approach
This study used an interpretive paradigm. This specific approach is consistent with
the interview method (Hesse-Biber, 2017). Public agencies are collections of individuals
who carry out public policy through interactions across policy domains. Hazard mitigation
actions require both consensus and collaboration of individuals across multiple agencies to
effect change. Furthermore, the execution of projects is complex, thus, understanding the
factors that prevent widespread adoption required a micro-level examination. This detail
requirement lends itself to the use of the interpretive strand.
Sampling
Since the research question focused specifically on FEMA Region III states (DC, DE,
MD, PA, VA, WV), the study used a purposive sample procedure. In this approach, the
researcher selects the sample based upon the research question (Hesse-Biber, 2017). Within
emergency management organizations, the State Hazard Mitigation Officer directly
administers hazard mitigation programs in each state. These responsibilities include
administering federal grants, providing programmatic guidance, and leveraging other
funding sources to implement local hazard mitigation projects. Individuals serving in this
role have direct knowledge that contributes to the research question; thus, they were
purposively selected for interview.
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Data Collection Approach
This study leveraged semi-structured in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews are
issue-oriented, allowing a researcher to gain an understanding of a particular issue (Rubin &
Rubin, 2012; Hesse-Biber, 2017). Since the research question sought to understand the
conditions impacting a very specific issue, in this case, hazard mitigation actions, it is a
method appropriate for the study. To allow for open conversation, the interview guide used
semi-structured questions. This approach spurred conversation without needlessly restricting
the direction of the interview.
Of importance to the research design is the issue of reflexivity, that is, the process by
which the researcher examines preconceived notions they have regarding the research topic
(Hsiung, 2008). In the qualitative interview research design the interaction between the
interviewer and interviewee impact the perceptions of each other, thus impacting the
outcome of the interview (Jorgenson, 1991). It is important to note the researcher’s implicit
bias, given his professional association and experience on the topic. This is addressed later
in the professional conflict of interest section.
This study first required approval from West Chester University’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) since it involved human subjects. This process involved providing the
study approach and key documents to the IRB for review and approval. In addition to the
interview guide (See Appendix V), informed consent (See Appendix III), and recruitment
language, the researcher also submitted a letter of endorsement from his employer (See
Appendix IV). The letter stipulated that the research was of value to the field and that the
research was being completed outside his normal work duties. In July, 2021 West Chester
University’s IRB approved the study (See Appendix II), and data collection began.
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Professional Conflict of Interest Protections
Since the researcher is a practitioner actively working in the field and managing staff
who administer hazard mitigation programs, special protocols were in place. These
protections related specifically to professional conflict of interest included disclosing the
researcher’s professional role and ensuring participants understood that this study was being
conducted as university sponsored research. This potential conflict of interest was disclosed
to the IRB and stated at the start of each interview. Ensuring participants were clear on the
role of the researcher was particularly important for the Maryland interview since the
researcher is the supervisor of the participant.
As an added protection the researcher obtained a letter for support from the Maryland
Emergency Management Agency (now the Maryland Department of Emergency
Management)’s Executive Director. The letter further delineated the researcher’s
professional association and the study which was conducted to fulfil the requirements of the
Doctor of Public Administration program at West Chester University of Pennsylvania. This
letter was submitted to the IRB and because part of the final approved package from the
IRB. The letter was not shared with participants or those not involved in the IRB approval
process.
Recruitment
The researcher emailed each of the six participants individually with the approved
recruitment email. Upon response, the participant and the researcher scheduled a time to
meet via Zoom, and a calendar invite was sent. Before the interview, the researcher provided
a copy of the informed consent protocol and the interview guide so the participant could
adequately prepare.
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Informed Consent
Informed consent was managed in line with West Chester University policy and
consistently with approved practices from the IRB. The risks and benefits of the study were
reviewed with the participant prior to the start of the interview, and each participant
electronically signed the informed consent form. The executed informed consent forms
became part of the stored project file, per the approved procedures of the IRB.
Participant Identity Protections
While this study actively disclosed that the Region III SHMOs were the participants
in the study, special care was given to protect their identities. First, no direct quotes were
attributed to a specific state. Next, the identity was removed for the jurisdiction name, and
generalized to the term “state.” This is important since the study technically featured three
SHMOs from states, two from commonwealths, and one from the District of Columbia.
Generalizing this term to state provided an extra layer of anonymity. Community names
were also withheld, and generalized. Finally, all participants were informed of the potential
risks and signed informed consent forms.
Interview Procedures
Interviews were conducted via Zoom for ease of convenience for the researcher and
the participant, and also given the proliferation of video conferencing as a result of the
COVID-19 Global Pandemic. At the start of each interview, the researcher first obtained
informed consent from the participant, provided an overview of the project, reiterated that
this was university-sponsored research, and allowed the participant a chance to ask
questions. At that point, he obtained permission to record the conversation and pressed the
record button. Using the interview guide as the basis for conversation, the researcher
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conducted the interview. Upon completion of the interview, the recording was stopped and
the researcher allowed time for additional questions. Each interview took roughly 1 – 1.5
hours to complete. The Zoom recordings were stored in the researcher’s password protected
account in compliance with the WCU IRB.
Transcription
After each interview, the researcher transcribed the proceedings. Zoom automatically
produces a transcript of meetings that the program allows the user to download. While this
serves as a helpful starting point, the transcript requires editing to ensure accuracy. After
each interview the researcher used the video recording to produce an accurate transcript
based on the Zoom draft transcript. The final transcripts served as the basis for coding and
the data analysis process.
Coding & Data Analysis
The data collection process produced a significant amount of text which required a
systematic coding process. As data collection was ongoing the analysis process began. This
involved the coding process which began to preliminary findings. Beginning analysis early
on in the process was critical in identifying broad themes and specific conditions impacting
the research question.
Coding is a process by which a researcher labels a specific passage of information
based on their understanding of the text. The process typically has two steps, open coding
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and focused coding (Bazeley, 2013). The coding intends to move
from data to descriptive analysis. The process is cyclical, meaning the researcher initially
generates codes, assigns data, refines codes, and reassigns data appropriately. Overall, itis a
means of sorting and ordering data (Bazeley, 2013).
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Data that illustrates specific conditions that influenced community hazard mitigation
action was coded similarly as codes emerge through the process of open coding. This
process included chunking text the use of overlapping codes where text presents several
ideas. This is a common occurrence when coding interviews. As the initial set of codes
emerge, they were sorted and connected to existing codes for further refinement. This
process continues until the point of saturation, generally when no new codes emerge
(Bazeley, 2013). Another critical component is creating a codebook which helps focus the
coder as they go through the process (Bazeley, 2013). This study utilized a codebook and
will include new entries as new codes emerge.
Upon completion of open coding the researcher moved to focused coding. Focused
coding is the process by which codes translate to theory. This includes comparing coded
data and developing multidimensional data. Focused coding was the last step in the process
before moving onto deeper analysis (Bazeley, 2013).
Given the volume of data from the six interviews, coding software assisted with the
analysis process. Coding software assists not with volume but also overlapping codes
(Bazeley, 2013), which will be part of this study’s data analysis. Software can also help later
on in analysis as the researcher groups codes and creates hierarchy (Bazeley, 2013).
Dedoose was the program of choice for this study, given the researcher’s preference of the
software and the ability to manage overlapping codes.
Once coding was complete, the next step was theorizing concepts. Any ideas that
come from research typically sets off a chain of events which includes checking evidence
and clarifying data. The process of developing concepts features a review of existing data
(Bazeley, 2013). This study used an inductive approach where data is gathered first, from
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which theory is developed. This is despite the four conditions the researcher believed
impacted the research question at the start of the study. The theory emerged from grouping
codes and identifying co-related dimensions (Bazeley, 2013). The theory-building phase of
analysis continued until the conditions that inhibit the adoption of hazard mitigation action
are clear. At this point, reference back to the literature and comparative analysis assisted in
drawing broad conclusions about the data. Once this is complete, the analysis ends and leads
to the final presentation of study results through findings that are rich with description
(Bazeley, 2013).
Validity
Issues of validity are central to qualitative research (Atkinson et al., 2003). This study
leveraged a transactional approach to validity. Cho and Trent (2006) note that this
approach’s aim is to achieve a higher-level of accuracy by ensuring that data is verified and
interpreted correctly. This approach assumes that the credibility of the research improves if
the researcher takes deliberate steps to verify data.
Cho and Trent (2006) view issues of validity an ongoing process rather than a discrete
step. Researchers should constantly be thinking out loud if their approach is correct and that
appropriate safeguards are in place. Researchers who seek thick rich description maintain
these constant checks of validity throughout the process (Geertz, 1973).
One method to ensure validity is the process of triangulation. This approach uses
multiple data points to verify the accuracy of information. Triangulation is one of two
methods, the other being member checking whereby the researcher verifies information
received during an interview (Cho & Trent, 2006). Both of these processes were used during
the data collection phase of this study.
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Throughout data collection the researcher considered issues of validity. An ongoing
approach, the researcher asked probing questions related to information revealed in previous
questions. This allowed for independent verification of information, and increased the
credibility of the participant. Data was also triangulated, when possible, with other sources
of information such as data that was readily available (e.g. grant award information).
Finally, the researcher was able to verify information based on their subject matter expertise
and experiences outside the study.
While member checking typically involves replaying audio or providing data back to
participants for verification (Cho & Trent, 2006), this study featured a modified version of
that. During interviews the researcher repeated key pieces of information back to the
participant to ensure accuracy and to verify that the correct answer was given. Again, this
was an ongoing process that occurred throughout the study.
Finally, prior to analysis the researcher re-listened to each interview, to detect any
deviations on the transcript. This was to ensure that data was captured accurately prior to the
data analysis process. During analysis the researcher also continued the process of
triangulation, by searching for similar information that crossed each of the interviews.
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Chapter IV: Results

The following section presents the results from the qualitative data collection process.
Data collection involved conducting semi-structured interviews with six State Hazard
Mitigation Officers within FEMA Region III. The jurisdictions in this sample included
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West Virginia.
Throughout the coding process it was apparent that the four original conditions
impacting the research question; organizational capacity, network governance, collaborative
governance, and community participation/risk perception all impacted the ability for local
and state agencies to implement hazard mitigation programs and projects. Of the four
conditions, organizational capacity emerged as the dominant condition impacting the
research question. This section presents a discussion of each condition. In addition, this
chapter provides additional insight into hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction
programs which public administrators can use to improve their communities.
Organizational Capacity
Participants overwhelmingly cited limited capacity to navigate the complex
environment of rules, regulations, and requirements of hazard mitigation grants as a hurdle to
obtaining funding, and thus reducing disaster risk in communities. It became apparent that
the programs intended to reach the region’s most vulnerable communities are simply out of
reach for many agencies which are operating with limited staffing, technical expertise, and
funding. Issues of organizational capacity extend beyond just the local community level,
rather, states and federal agencies administering hazard mitigation programs have limited
capacity to effectively administer these programs.
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In general communities with the most resources have made more progress in reducing
overall disaster risk than those with fewer resources. In addition, historically disenfranchised
minority communities fared worse than affluent communities with sufficient organizational
capacity. For example, coastal communities within the study area have a relatively equal
level of disaster vulnerability, however, affluent coastal towns have successfully
implemented widespread hazard mitigation projects to reduce disaster risk. Despite the
success of these communities, others, primarily economically disenfranchised communities
with similar vulnerability in the region have not had the same level of success. This is a clear
issue of organizational capacity and more broadly speaks to the need to install equity as a
staple of program delivery across hazard mitigation programs. The following discussion
addresses the individual components of the organizational capacity condition as they relate to
the research question.
Funding
Study participants overwhelmingly cited funding as a barrier to implementing hazard
mitigation projects within each of the states within the region. While there is some local and
state investment in mitigation projects, communities in the study area primarily rely upon
FEMA mitigation grants. The federal funding available is not sufficient to make even
marginal progress in reducing disaster risk.
As noted in Chapter 2, FEMA provides funding for hazard mitigation projects
through both pre-disaster grant programs (Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities and
Flood Mitigation Assistance) and mitigation funding (Hazard Mitigation Grant Program)
awarded to communities impacted by disaster. While additional federal funding is available
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through HUD and USEDA across the United States, including FEMA Region III, in general
states have not fully leveraged funding outside FEMA programs.
The level of funding for FEMA programs is problematic in a number of ways. First,
both BRIC and FMA are nationally competitive programs that often receive far more
applications than available funding. In the last round of BRIC, FEMA received roughly $3
billion in applications for a program with $500 million in funding available. In this same year
only three states within FEMA Region 3 (Maryland, Virginia, and Washington D.C.)
received funding through this program. For communities that need funding the most, there is
simply not enough to go around.
Aside from the pre-disaster mitigation grant programs, access to HMGP is also
difficult for states in Region III. Unlike highly disaster-prone regions of the country (e.g.
Southeast Gulf states), states in Region III, with the exception of the COVID-19 pandemic,
generally do not experience major disasters, and thus receive little or no HMGP. Half of the
states in the study did report significant recent disasters, however this is not uniform across
the region. In any case funding available across the region is not consistent.
While the overall funding levels are not sufficient to meet the demand, more
problematic is the non-federal cost share associated with federal grants. FEMA grants
generally include a 75% federal, 25% non-federal cost share, whereby the local jurisdiction is
required to meet the 25% match requirement. This requirement, simply stated, is out of reach
for most local jurisdictions that do not have sufficient funding to meet this match.
Communities can meet the non-federal match requirement through in-kind services for
smaller projects however larger infrastructure projects generate non-federal match
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requirements of hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. The non-federal match is a
significant barrier to local communities, and was cited by all six states as an issue.
To overcome this barrier some states have opted to cover the non-federal match for
local communities. This significantly reduces this barrier however is not standard practice
across the region. For states that fund the non-federal match, their assistance is limited to the
HMGP disaster grants, however, one state mentioned they were unsure how long this would
last given major disasters they have experienced recently and the amount of state funds
recently dedicated to meeting the requirement. Another state indicated that the state
legislature has taken up the issue and dedicated future funding for non-federal match
requirements, however, this program had yet to be implemented. State funding for local
match requirements is a best practice which should be adopted universally, however, this also
is challenging given limited budgets and funding at the state level.
Related also to funding is the cost of developing federal grant applications.
Developing an application capable of competing for national funding, and one that FEMA
determines is eligible is complex, challenging, and expensive. Consulting firms offer
professional grant writing and project development services, but these services come at a
price. Again, this favors communities with a high-organizational capacity and the requisite
funding to use contractual support. Several states indicated that communities that use
professional consulting services have higher success rates or as one state put it “they at least
have a fighting chance.” The use of expensive consulting firms is a symptom of a larger
issue. Many communities lack sufficient technical expertise and specialized staff to obtain
mitigation grants.
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Technical Expertise & Staffing
FEMA’s hazard mitigation grant programs are highly complex and administratively
burdensome. One state identified over 100 key decision points from the inception to the
closeout of hazard mitigation projects. In addition to the volume of administrative
requirements, these programs are highly-technical in nature, requiring specialized staff to
prepare and execute projects. This leads agencies to either hire consultants (discussed
previously) or reach to other government agencies at all levels (local, state, federal) for
technical assistance. The highly-technical nature of these programs necessitate stability in
program staff, however, local, state, and federal agencies are plagued with turnover which
inhibits progress.
The complexity of FEMA grants creates inequities between communities with and
without staff to complete applications and manage projects. Emergency management
agencies are primarily the organizations that coordinate and manage FEMA grants, and in
many cases these offices consist of one to two staff members who have responsibilities that
transcend numerous subject areas, one of which is hazard mitigation. Among the duties they
complete, mitigation is often lower on the priority list, taking a back seat to acute emergency
response actions. In fact, one state reported a large county emergency management office
that chose not to pursue mitigation grants due to priority response duties. Although the
majority of local communities place hazard mitigation in emergency management, other
agencies, such as planning and zoning, public works, or the county executive’s office
sometimes lead mitigation actions. Across the region there is no standard or best practice.
What is consistent across the region is the local agency administering the projects
often lacks sufficient staffing, technical expertise, or political will for hazard mitigation
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projects. FEMA requires full design and engineering work for structural mitigation projects,
and requires the applicant to show cost effectiveness through a highly-technical benefit cost
analysis (BCA) process. The BCA requires engineering expertise and specialized training to
complete. Again, many communities, particularly smaller ones, lack the resources to meet
this requirement.
One participant joked that they were able to overcome the BCA barrier simply
“because we got lucky.” There also appears to be inconsistency in the way that FEMA
regions apply the BCA. One participant, with experience in other FEMA regions said “before
I came to this state I didn’t know what a BCA was, because everything was simply
approved.” Three of the states mentioned specifically that they hire contractors to complete
the BCA process. This certainly helps communities who lack technical expertise, but that
comes at a price. Contracted services are often expensive, forcing states to reprioritize
funding from one area to another (discussed further in the funding section).
The entire application process is also drawn out, often taking years to complete, and
is fraught with problems. One participant highlighted a situation where a local project took
six years to be awarded, given a complex historical and environmental review. In this
instance, the project manager joked that their son was born when they first applied for
funding, and now was starting first grade. While this example is extreme, most projects take
two years to be awarded, before work can even begin. This level of complexity requires local
projects managers to devote a significant amount of time to one project. In agencies with
limited staffing resources this is a burden, and a significant barrier to making progress in
reducing disaster risk. Many local communities simply do not see the value or sufficient
return on investment to pursue mitigation.
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Local communities also struggle with the application process itself. One participant
noted that many of their medium to small sized communities have trouble completing the
state’s basic mitigation project application. The participant stated that “our application is not
tough, we have purposely made it simple.” Despite this they noted that communities struggle
to provide basic information. In fact, in this state, the state agency enters local projects into
FEMA’s complex FEMA-GO system which is the nationwide system used to submit project
applications. The participant notes that “it’s just a matter of gathering the information and
writing stuff out, but that seems to be a hold up for a lot of the communities.” This same state
noted that communities who use a consultant to develop the project applications fare much
better than those who do not.
State-level agencies that administer hazard mitigation grants, supporting local
application development, also lack sufficient staffing resources. Across the region hazard
mitigation branches generally consist of a State Hazard Mitigation Officer, 1-5 staff of
project officers, and in some cases additional support staff. The states, lack technical experts,
engineers, and other highly-skilled staff which could be used to assist with local projects.
This is in stark contrast to states in other FEMA regions, one in particular, with a staff of
over 40 individuals supporting local hazard mitigation projects. It represents an underinvestment of state resources for hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction. A promising
trend, however, is investment at the state-level in the Chief Resilience Officer position.
While currently only three states in the study area have this position in place, they are
charged with working across government to locate and coordinate alternative funding sources
for local and state actions. Appointing Chief Resilience Officers to coordinate risk reduction
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actions is a trend nationwide, as of 2020 there were over a dozen states and countless local
communities who have taken this step (Snider, 2020).
Participants also cited challenges with FEMA mitigation staffing. Inconsistent
application of policy, lack of knowledge of regulation, and slow response to inquiries were
issues commonly noted during the data collection process. One participant expressed their
frustration given the inconsistency of policy, and the time it takes to re-train new FEMA
staff. As new staff become familiar with the programs, they inadvertently give wrong advice,
misapply policy, or cause delays in the process. While FEMA has made strides in improving
staff capability, this remains a challenge and was a consistently cited issue.
Regardless of level of government, local, state, and federal agencies suffer from
similar issues related to staff and program expertise. Turnover is a significant challenge at all
three levels. As skilled staff and policy experts depart hazard mitigation roles programs
suffer. Inexperienced staff lead to program errors, frustration, and lost time as agencies work
to implement programs and projects. Turnover and challenges with staffing was universally
cited across all states in the study.
Program Complexity
The lack of local and state organizational capacity speaks to a broader issue with
FEMA’s hazard mitigation assistance programs, complexity. FEMA’s programs, which are
the primary way that states are funding mitigation in the region, require a high-level of
organizational capacity which simply does not exist throughout the region. In addition, many
participants commented on the length of time the process takes and the administrative
burdens placed upon state and local agencies who administer or manage the implementation
of these programs.
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The complexity of the programs leads to bad project outcomes. One participant
outlined a complex project with many problems, characterized as “one of the most complex
projects you’ve ever dealt with.” The project was problematic that the community said “we
can go other places that are much easier than your FEMA dollars so, no thank you.” Several
participants shared horror stories of projects gone wrong, and commonly cited home
elevation projects as particularly challenging.
Cited most often as a barrier to project implementation was the benefit cost analysis
process (BCA). The BCA is a required element of a FEMA grant application, in which the
applicant must show that the intended project is cost effective. This process is highlytechnical and requires specialized training to complete. Not only do most communities not
have the extra time to invest in learning the process but the BCA is a major barrier to project
approval, and is often a critical failure point for an application. The BCA itself is inequitable,
favoring large, expensive home rather than less expensive homes that have lower values. One
participant noted that they have no problem getting projects approved and through the BCA
process because the homes that are vulnerable in their state are on the shore and they are
mainly “rich communities.” In the most recent round of BRIC applications one state hired a
consultant to complete this step of the process for local jurisdictions. They found this to be an
effective way to use resources and the local jurisdictions appreciated the service. This is
certainly not a standard practice across the region, and depends on availability of funding
which is episodic at best.
Related also to complexity, several participants mentioned a bad experience with
FEMA’s first round of BRIC funding. After communities devoted a good deal of energy and
time to the application process, many were disappointed with the lack of distribution of
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funding across the nation (only 22 projects awarded in the nationwide competitive category).
This participant stated “is the juice worth the squeeze? I don’t know what I am going to say
[to the communities]. FEMA needs to right the ship in the second year because many folks
think that the program is bogus and won’t apply again.”
Leadership
Another component of organizational capacity includes the priorities of an
organization’s leaders. The leadership of an organization control budgets and resources and
influence agency priorities. Across the region there are local communities that continuously
apply for and receive mitigation grants. These are communities that prioritize mitigation over
other initiatives and are persistent in pursuing grants.
For example, one inland community subjected to riverine flooding has been
incredibly successful at making widespread community progress in reducing disaster risk.
This was the result of persistence and local leadership that has prioritized mitigation. In fact,
agency leaders, working through the state, have consistently challenged FEMA on program
eligibility issues, and successfully implemented programs despite the programmatic
complexity described earlier. In short, success takes persistence, organizational leadership,
and organizational capacity.
As discussed previously some agencies do not see the value in pursuing hazard
mitigation due to the complexity and low return on investment. One large metropolitan
county emergency management director once remarked that they “did not understand why
mitigation was located in emergency management.” That agency chose to only focus on
response and recovery issues. Other communities have avoided mitigation projects as a result
of a bad experience, lawsuit, or based upon what they hear from colleagues about the
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challenges with mitigation projects. Oftentimes it comes down to the priorities of agency or
community leadership, and their willingness to devote scarce resources to mitigation
programs.
Lack of organizational capacity, coupled with complex administratively burdensome
programs from FEMA significantly inhibit mitigation and risk reduction efforts. Participants
overwhelmingly cited this condition as a significant barrier to building safer communities in
their states. In fact, organizational capacity was the predominant factor that emerged during
the analysis process. This was anticipated, however, the consistency of challenges across all
six states exceeded the expectations of the researchers. When asked if communities with the
highest vulnerability and greatest need receive the most assistance the response was “most
certainly not.”
Community Participation & Risk Perception
Data collection also revealed that communities that had an acute sense of disaster risk
and high levels of community participation were likely to apply for hazard mitigation
funding, and thus reduce disaster risk. Participants reported that communities with active
citizen participation and support from lawmakers often applied, successfully, for mitigation
funding consistently. In addition, after a disaster, during periods of heightened risk
awareness, state hazard mitigation officers typically receive a flood of inquiries and interest
in hazard mitigation programs from homeowners eager to reduce the likelihood of future
impacts. This indicates that where communities are aware of their hazards and participate in
the process, there is a greater desire to take active action to reduce disaster risk. This finding
is consistent with Fussel (2006) and Ravera and Tarrason (2011).
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Citizen Engagement
Communities with active citizens that understand disaster risk were successful in
obtaining grants to reduce disaster risk. One participant noted that communities in which the
citizenry “make a lot of noise” were successful in elevating the conversation and thus
obtaining resources to implement hazard mitigation projects. This was a consistent theme
across the region, communities with vocal citizen advocates for hazard mitigation were more
successful than communities in which government does not engage with citizens.
Pre-Disaster vs. Post-Disaster Engagement
Consistently across the region, the interviews revealed that citizens are more engaged
in hazard mitigation project formulation and execution in the post-disaster period. This is not
surprising as citizens have a heightened sense of disaster risk in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster. During this period, they are acutely aware of the hazards they face and are interested
in the measures they can take to protect themselves and their community from future disaster.
Several participants mentioned that they receive a surge of citizen interest in hazard
mitigation programs immediately following a disaster. One of the participants noted that
interest is often so high that they respond with a standard form letter that explains the
programs and what steps a citizen must take to apply for mitigation assistance. One
participant stated that private tornado shelters is a common project type that homeowners
contract the state about. They said they get citizen inquiries “once a week and God forbid a
storm happened, I get like five in one week.” Heightened interest and awareness of hazard
mitigation programs was commonly noted across the region. Areas of the region that were
highly vulnerable to disaster and those impacted by multiple disasters tended to have highlevels of citizen engagement.
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The results of this study showed with a few exceptions, citizens tended to be less
engaged in the project development phase for pre-disaster mitigation grants than post-disaster
programs across the region. This finding is likely related to risk perception, Huang et al.
(2012) who found that past disaster experience are more acutely aware of the risks they face.
This finding is likely for several reasons. First, these projects tend to be large-scale
infrastructure projects that take several years to develop and execute. This is in contrast to
many of the post-disaster projects that are often individual homeowner projects (e.g.
acquisition/demolition or home elevation projects). Second, the immediate post-disaster
period is one in which citizens are processing what just happened, and they are acutely aware
of their disaster risks. Finally, major disasters bring with them a surge in financial resources
through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. These are funds that are controlled by the
state rather than pre-disaster mitigation grants that are nationally competitive. States make
citizens aware of recovery resources post-disaster which includes education on available
hazard mitigation funding.
Elected Officials Engagement
Several states discussed the role that elected officials play in promoting and
ultimately securing funding for hazard mitigation programs. Like citizens, lawmakers from
states that experience frequent or severe disasters are engaged in the process and work to
obtain resources for their communities. One state includes their elected officials their
standing resilience committees which could be considered a best practice. They found this
relationship to be beneficial because the elected officials understand the process. They said
“it’s been very helpful because I’ve noticed a change in the amount of inquiries
congressional communications that I receive because people understand it more.” By
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involving lawmakers on this committee, they better understand the risks their constituents
face. This in turn leads to better outcomes when competing for federal mitigation funding or
has also increased state funding for hazard mitigation programs.
In one flood prone community in the region citizens, after a series of devastating
floods, successfully engaged their local, state, and federal lawmakers in an effort to prevent
future disasters. By raising awareness and leveraging their congressional delegation to
pressure FEMA they were able to secure millions of dollars of funding to implement
sweeping hazard mitigation projects which will lessen the impact of future disasters. This is
just one example of the power of citizen engagement. Several participants noted the
importance of leveraging elected officials to pressure the White House and FEMA to make
hazard mitigation awards. When citizens are aware of the hazards they face and are engaged
in the process they can access the levers of government to make significant progress in
reducing disaster risk.
Education & Outreach
An understanding of the hazards and risks that a community faces starts with
education and community outreach programs. In order for citizens to engage in the hazard
mitigation process they must first know that hazard mitigation programs exist. For states
that have sufficient staffing or financial resources, community outreach programs have been
successful in elevating the profile of hazard mitigation and also informing community
members of the risks they face.
One participant outlined how their education and outreach efforts have successfully
increased the visibility of the programs they administer and empowered the community.
Their efforts have inspired several grass-roots level efforts that have led to positive
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outcomes such as identification of projects that ultimately received funding, thus leading to
reduced disaster risk. Given that mitigation programs are voluntary in nature, State Hazard
Mitigation Officers have found that projects developed from a bottom-up rather than topdown approach are more successful and more easily sold to the community.
Despite successful outcomes from education and outreach activities, the reality is that
state-level agencies that administer these programs have limited resources. All participants
mentioned the need to increase outreach and education efforts throughout their states and
the important role that citizens should play in project development. FEMA also plays an
important role in increasing awareness of the programs that are available to reduce disaster
risk, however, their outreach efforts must be coordinated and/or delivered in tandem with
states. One state noted the burdens it sometimes creates when FEMA promotes their
programs, since citizens consult the states directly for assistance. Nonetheless, it is apparent
that increasing outreach efforts will help to inform citizens of the risks they face.
The results of data collection and analysis show that although this condition was not
as important as organizational capacity, the way the public interacts with government does
influence adoption of hazard mitigation programs. Highly-engaged citizens are able to use
their influence, and the powerful influence of their elected officials, to drive hazard
mitigation projects. It is also apparent that citizens are the most aware of the risks they face
in the immediate period after a disaster occurs, thus, increased risk perception leads to a
greater emphasis on hazard mitigation.
Networked Governance
Communities are in the infancy of leveraging networks to reduce disaster risk. Across
the region some communities have used networks as ways to pool technical or specialized
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resources. This has been especially useful in small, rural communities that lack sufficient
organizational capacity. While successful in some states within the region, this is not a
widespread practice. All four of Agranoff’s (2007) public management networks were
present within the study, and enabled communities to implement hazard mitigation projects.
Informational Networks
Informational networks exist to exchange agency policies, best practices, and share
other information (Agranoff, 2007). The study revealed both local communities as well as
state agencies leverage informational networks to facilitate hazard mitigation projects. These
networks are important, given the complexity of hazard mitigation projects and the
challenges noted already about FEMA grants.
At the state level, a nationwide network of State Hazard Mitigation Officers exchange
information through a system appropriately named SHMO Net. This system allows the for
the free exchange of ideas related to the development, management, and execution of hazard
mitigation projects. Officials using this system are able to improve their delivery of grants to
local communities and thus improve the overall governance of the programs. A byproduct of
this system is also that it highlights governance inconsistencies between FEMA’s 10 regional
offices. For SHMOs with fewer resources SHMO Net also serves as a lifeline of information
which improves their service delivery.
Local communities that manage hazard mitigation projects also use informational
networks to augment their governance practices. At least one participant indicated that a
similar system to SHMO Net exists at the local community level. Like states, local
communities share best practices, administrative procedures, and grant management
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information between partners. These informational networks significantly improve the locallevel management and execution of hazard mitigation projects.
Developmental Networks
Developmental networks, or those in which agencies share programmatic information
that is later implemented locally (Agranoff, 2007), also emerged as an important tool for
hazard mitigation governance. Developmental networks exist throughout the region primarily
in the form of educational and outreach activities. Each state, county, or local municipal
agency typically conducts their own outreach activities, however the resources to train and
education the public are developed either at the federal or state level. By pooling these
resources communities do not have to develop their own resources but still execute local
outreach efforts individually.
Outreach Networks
Outreach networks differ from those previously discussed because they lead to joint
programmatic decision making between agencies through the pooling of resources
(Agranoff, 2007). Outreach networks exist throughout the study area, primarily taking the
form of regional planning consortiums. In several states, these entities are taking the lead in
developing regional hazard mitigation plans that include multiple county or sub-county
jurisdictions. These plans are a requirement to remain eligible to receive FEMA mitigation
grants and must be updated every five years. The planning process itself is resource
intensive, requiring at least a year’s worth of effort.
Across the region many communities simply do not have the resources to undertake
this process and they have instead leveraged these planning consortiums. These allow for
the pooling of resources and lessen the individual burdens on one particular entity. An
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added benefit is these networks reduce the work required for states and FEMA to ensure that
all communities have an active plan. Regional planning consortiums were cited as a best
practice in three states in the study area. Across the region this should become standard
practice. The result is greater efficiency, reduced local burdens, and reduced cost to
taxpayers.
Action Networks
A less common, yet promising practice is the use of action networks for project
execution. Action networks are the most developed of the typology, featuring joint
programming and project execution (Agranoff, 2007). One state mentioned the importance
of regional networks in not just planning but actual project execution in rural regions of the
state where resources were limited. In this state the regional network managed the entire
lifecycle of the mitigation project, from grant application to execution, ending in project
closeout. In this circumstance it is apparent that without the action network, communities
who are a part of the network would likely not pursue hazard mitigation programs, given
their resource limitations.
In another state, county emergency managers formed a regional action network
seeking to address riverine flooding within a multi-jurisdictional watershed. First leveraging
a technical assistance project from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
this group developed cooperative cost-sharing agreements. The group successfully obtained
funding by jointly applying to the USACE grant, leveraging the principles of an action
network. This project is nearing the end of the study phase and is in the process of
transitioning into project execution. As they identify individual projects the group plans to
make joint decisions and pool funding to execute the series of region-wide projects. This is a
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particularly effective strategy as disasters do not follow jurisdictional boundaries, rather,
they impact regions based on topography and hazard conditions.
Overall, networks, while a less cited condition impacting hazard mitigation
governance, will be an important factor moving forward. As disaster risk becomes more
complex and interconnected, individual communities will increasingly need to leverage
networks to make progress in reducing risk. In addition, the increased burdens on local
communities will necessitate the innovative and efficient use of resources. Communities
across the United States should explore the use of networks to facilitate hazard mitigation
programs.
Collaborative Governance
Pursuing hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction projects is complex. The level
of effort and expertise simply transcends one agency within a community, thus, making
collaborative governance vital in successful implementation of projects. At the state-level,
many participants noted how collaborative governance practices have improved local-level
implementation of mitigation actions. While participants cited collaborative governance few
times than other factors influencing hazard mitigation adoption, it remains an important
element in a community's overall hazard mitigation strategy.
Local
What became clear throughout data collection and analysis is that one local
department or agency is unable to execute hazard mitigation projects from start to finish.
While it is common for one agency to serve as the project manager or project administrator
(most frequently local emergency management), the programs have a level of complexity
that requires collaborative governance across multiple agencies. For example, the
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engineering work required to complete a project might be completed by the public works
department, the project design and timeline may be handled by the planning department, and
the emergency management department might serve as the overall project manager. There is
not one dominant governance model.
Emergency managers are well suited to coordinate hazard mitigation projects. They
are well-versed in multiagency coordination, understand how to solve complex problems,
and are acutely aware of the threats and hazards facing their communities. Other local
agencies typically involved in these projects include planning and zoning, public works,
engineering, county executive’s office and/or elected officials, and sometimes emergency
services. Aside from government agencies, mitigation projects sometimes involve non-profit
and private sector agencies. Collaborative governance, working across agencies in a local
community, is vitally important to the success of hazard mitigation programs.
State
State agencies who administer hazard mitigation grants are starting to work across
state government to address hazard mitigation more broadly rather than focusing just on
FEMA grants. This marks a shift in mindset where the sole focus was just the three FEMA
programs, HUD program, or USEDA programs that provide grant funding for local project
implementation. This shift necessitates collaborative governance at the state-level between
agencies that fund resilience through other federal or state programs.
One state is expanding their focus of hazard mitigation towards all issues of
resilience. They are in the process of expanding the scope of an existing mitigation
committee comprised of principal state departments to review and fund projects from more
than FEMA grants. The committee will meet bi-monthly and review local hazard mitigation
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project applications which the state will accept on a rolling basis. Based upon the scope of
the project, timeline, and tasks, the committee might fund the project through state grants,
federal grants, or seek non-governmental funding for the project. Essentially this state seeks
to become the emergency managers of resilience and hazard mitigation, that is, the entity that
brings together a series of state partners to solve complex risk reduction problems.
Aside from this practice, several other states are in the process of integrating hazard
mitigation across state government through an office of resilience. Led by a chief resilience
officer, these offices function much in the same way as described with the previous example.
They work across state government collaboratively to pair resilience and mitigation programs
together to support the needs of local communities. In addition, they function to make
strategic investments at the state-level, such as reviewing state investment to ensure it meets
resilience standards, coordinating workgroups to conduct projects, and securing funding,
which reduces the state’s disaster risk. In this role the chief resilience officer is functioning as
the emergency manager for resilience, bringing together multiple agencies to reduce disaster
risk.
The study revealed that collaborative governance is an important enabling concept to
effectively implement hazard mitigation projects. While this condition came up less
frequently than others during data collection and analysis, it remains important. Perhaps
participants overlooked the importance of collaborative governance (e.g. Emerson &
Nabatchi, 2015) because it is generally standard practice for mitigation projects or there are
other factors at play such as a legacy approach to governance such as Old Public
Administration (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). Still, however, solving complex problems
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requires a multiagency approach thus collaborative governance remains an important
condition for success.
Discussion
All four conditions originally included in this study’s theory impact the research
question. Across the entirety of the study area organizational capacity emerged as the most
frequently cited issue affecting hazard mitigation governance. Organizational capacity was
also the only condition that negatively influenced, in other words, inhibited the ability of
communities to implement hazard mitigation projects. Community participation and risk
perception, networks, and collaborative governance were all conditions that, when present,
increased the ability for adoption of hazard mitigation projects.
These results are not surprising, however, organizational capacity stood prominently
apart from the other conditions as a significant issue. Overwhelmingly participants noted the
complexity of the grant programs, the delays in dispersing funds, and challenges with project
management for FEMA grant programs. The complexity of these programs challenges the
organizational capacity of even the most robust local agencies, who often do not feel there is
sufficient return on investment to pursue grants. The reality is that, according to the
participants of this study, communities who need to reduce disaster risk the most are often
the ones with the least organizational capacity.
The financial component of organizational capacity proved to be a consistent
challenge for communities the pursue hazard mitigation projects. The 25% non-federal match
requirement placed on local communities is out of reach for most communities. This is
especially true for small communities that have limited financial resources. While
communities are able to provide in-kind match through salaries, for large infrastructure
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projects, they are often required to provide cash match. Some states (three of six in the
region) now provide the non-federal match on behalf of local communities, but this is not
standard practice.
Even at the state level where agencies typically have a deeper bench of hazard
mitigation resources, their organizational capacity it also limited. A typical hazard mitigation
branch in the region is between four to five people who have responsibilities spread across
the state. In other regions where hazard mitigation is prioritized higher, offices tend to be
much larger and states provide more state funding to contribute to the efforts.
Related also to organizational capacity is a lack of staff and consistent challenges
with turnover. Turnover is a challenge at all three levels (local, state, and federal) and inhibits
the effectiveness of hazard mitigation programs. When staff leave an agency they take with
them the knowledge of these complex program. Their skills and expertise are not easily
replaced, rather, newly hired staff require extensive training to administer these programs.
Retention is improving as the emergency management field professionalizes, however, this is
still a challenge.
Challenges of organizational capacity also highlight the inequities of hazard
mitigation programs throughout the study area. Organizations who have the highest
organizational capacity are able to obtain more funding, however, they are not necessarily the
organizations that require the most assistance. Additionally, the programs are complex such
that, communities with less organizational capacity are unable to meet the administrative
requirements. This is clearly an issue of equity, and federal and state hazard mitigation
programs must be re-envisioned to address these inequities. Consistently throughout the
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study limited organizational capacity dominated the interviews and proves to be a significant
challenge.
Community participation and increased risk perception had a positive impact on
hazard mitigation governance. Simply stated, communities with high-levels of citizen
engagement and those in which the disaster risk is understood, tend to see increased
emphasis and focus on mitigation. This is exemplified by the surge of citizen interest in
hazard mitigation programs immediately following a disaster. This is the period where
citizens are most acutely aware of the hazards they face. Data collection also revealed that
communities with vocal citizens attract the attention of lawmakers who advocate for risk
reduction efforts. This condition also proved to be influential for hazard mitigation
governance.
Networked governance, while largely underutilized across the region, is a best
practice to overcome challenges of organizational capacity (Agranoff, 2007). Communities
that pool resources together either to develop hazard mitigation plans or in actual execution
of projects see a cost savings and are able to leverage highly technical services. In the
current, and likely consistently resource constrained environment, networks offer a solution
to reduce disaster risk while limiting individual agency financial burdens. Even less
sophisticated networks such as SHMO Net provide a tangible benefit to the states who
engage in the information exchange and dialogue. Across the region and country agencies
engaged in hazard mitigation work should look to networks to effectively use resources.
Finally, collaborative governance is an important, yet less frequently cited, condition
for success. As mentioned several times, hazard mitigation projects are complex and require
expertise across a suite of agencies. No one agency at the local level is able to complete all of
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the tasks required from start to finish. The complexity of mitigation requires input from
multiple agencies, codes officials, lawyers, planning agencies, and emergency managers.
This is particularly true for the “horror stories” discussed earlier where misguided projects
end up in litigation. Collaboration and coordination are core functions of emergency
management, and those employing this model to hazard mitigation tend to be successful in
their pursuits. Successfully working across agencies is absolutely vital in a broader hazard
mitigation program.
State agencies also rely upon collaborative governance to creatively fund local
initiatives and to make progress on state-level risk reduction efforts. Installing the chief
resilience officer position to coordinate across state government is a best practice and a
growing trend across the country. FEMA hazard mitigation grants are one component of a
state’s hazard mitigation portfolio and states should continue to seek ways to invest state
funds as well as to pursue non-FEMA grants to support the needs of local jurisdictions.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
Summary
The purpose of this research was to determine the factors that influence hazard
mitigation governance in states within FEMA Region III. This qualitative study sought to
understand how organizational capacity, community participation and risk perception,
networked governance, and collaborative governance impacted the ability for communities to
reduce their disaster risk through mitigation projects.
Through a qualitative research approach that featured six semi-structured interviews
with the State Hazard Mitigation Officer in each state, the data collection and analysis phases
yielded rich contextual data. The coding process revealed that the four conditions included in
the original theory do indeed influence hazard mitigation governance. While participants
discussed each condition, it was clear that organizational capacity was the predominant factor
that influenced hazard mitigation governance.
The mitigation process from start to finish is complex and requires a level of technical
expertise that small, resource constrained communities have difficulty meeting. The capacity
to administer these programs is even constrained at the state level, where small staffs plagued
with high-turnover have difficulty maintaining services. These findings are consistent with
literature that speaks to organizational capacity.
The findings of this study are in line with Blumenthal (2003) who outlines the
importance of organizational capacity for public agencies carry out their missions. In
addition, this study found that small rural agencies struggle greatly with organizational
capacity which is consistent with De Vita et al. (2001). Overall, the study showed that hazard
mitigation programs are incredibly complex and requires a high degree of organizational
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capacity, again this finding is consistent with past research including Olshansky and Kartez
(1998), Brody (2003), and Laurian et al. (2004).
Community participation and risk perception also influences hazard mitigation
governance. In general, citizens who were engaged in the process were able to successfully
influence policy priorities, prioritizing hazard mitigation within their communities. This
participation also increases significantly after a disaster where citizens are acutely aware of
the hazards they face. This is indicated by the surges of interest that State Hazard Mitigation
Officers receive post disaster. Again, this is consistent with relevant literature on the topic.
The study findings of this condition are also consistent with existing literature.
Several scholars (Arnstein 1969; Afonso, 2017; Berner et al., 2017) discuss the importance of
citizen engagement in government programs and are able to influence policy through their
actions. Also, citizen engagement tended to be much higher in the aftermath of a disaster,
thus, citizens care more about risks and hazard mitigation after disaster. This finding is
important and consistent with Mileti (1999), Godshalk et al. (2003), and Stevens et al.
(2010). In addition, the study showed that past occurrences of disaster spurred interest in
mitigation, which Demuth et al. (2016) also found to be true.
Networks, when utilized by communities within this study, proved to be effective to
facilitate hazard mitigation governance. From very simple networks that exchange
information, best practices, and provide a forum for collaboration to sophisticated networks
that are managing the implementation of complex infrastructure projects across a region,
networks facilitate hazard mitigation action. Across the region communities significantly
underutilize networks which are a potential solution to a lack of organizational capacity.
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The networks that emerged in this study fit Agranoff’s (2007) typology, and his four levels of
networks were all present. It is clear that networks play a prominent role in policy
development (Agranoff & Mcguire, 2003) and this was also the case related to hazard
mitigation governance. The study also revealed that networks were important to improving
organizational capacity for disaster risk reduction activities, which is also what Djalnte
(2012) also found.
Mentioned far fewer times than the other conditions, collaborative governance still is
an important facilitator of hazard mitigation programs. Given the complexity of hazard
mitigation projects from start to finish, agencies are required to work across government to
meet the requirements for completion. Participants mentioned collaborative governance and
it appears to be a best-practice, however, additional work should be done to synthesize
collaborative efforts at the local and state level. With the appointment of chief resilience
officers in several states, communities will likely collaborative more deliberately across
government to solve resilience and risk issues.
Issues of hazard mitigation governance are complex and the study showed that
collaborative governance was necessary to solve these issues. Emerson & Nabatchi (2015)
speak to the importance of collaborative governance and including a diverse set of
stakeholders in solutions to complex problems. This study clearly illustrated how agencies
collaborate to address these complex challenges.
Limitations
Any study brings with it certain limitations which must be acknowledged, this
research is not different than others. First, this study had a very narrow sample, State Hazard
Mitigation Officers within FEMA Region III states. This narrow focus is a limitation in that
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the results, while valid, likely cannot be generalized to all regions of the United States. Each
of FEMA’s 10 regions are unique in terms of disaster risk, hazards, culture, and regional
office operating principles. This was readily apparent from one state hazard mitigation
officer who had worked both within Region III and in another region. This participant
reported vastly different operating priorities, organizational capacity, and sheer scale of
hazard mitigation project implementation. Clearly there are differences between regions, and
this study’s narrow scope was a limitation.
This study also just sampled the State Hazard Mitigation Officer in each of the six
states. A larger-scale study could have used a snowball sampling technique to identify
additional participants. These additions may have included the state emergency management
director, chief resilience officer, or other key staff involved in hazard mitigation. While the
State Hazard Mitigation Officer has the broadest and, in most cases, highest level of
understanding about hazard mitigation, additional interviews could have added context and
fresh perspectives to the study.
In addition, the states within the region have a similar hazard profile. While there are
certainly differences in the study area (e.g. coastal, mountains, urban, rural), the same
hazards generally affect all six states in the study. This hazard profile may impact the type,
scope, and acceptance of hazard mitigation programs. There are likely differences in other
FEMA regions with different hazard profiles.
A final limitation of the study is the researcher’s professional duties and as it relates
relationship with several of the participants. While precautions were taken to avoid bias (see
Chapter 3), the researcher’s position of authority may have influenced the results of the
study. Participants may have carefully chosen what information they were comfortable
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disclosing. On the other hand, the researcher’s position may have actually had an opposite
affect since their position gained instant credibility and entrée with participants. Nonetheless
the issue of reactivity was a concern in this study. Reactivity occurs when the participant’s
answers are affected either by the researcher or the survey instrument (Gibb, 2008). As
noted, however, careful measures were in place in the research design to avoid this issue.
While this likely did not have a major impact on the study it is a valid concern worth
mentioning.
Areas for Future Research
This study provides a model that is scalable and easily replicated in other regions of
the country. Future research should focus on examining issues of hazard mitigation
governance across the United States, particularly in regions where little empirical research
has occurred (e.g. outside coastal states prone to hurricanes). While a nationwide survey of
State Hazard Mitigation Officers has occurred (Gonick & Errett, 2018), it focused on climate
change specifically rather than governance more broadly. Upon completion of each region, a
comparative case study would highlight differences between each of the 10 regions.
Future research should also focus on issues of equity in program delivery of hazard
mitigation programs. Several participants expressed concerns that the communities that
needed the most assistance, including those with high disaster risk and high social
vulnerability, were not receiving the most assistance. A consistent theme was that rich
communities with access to powerful voices (e.g. legislators), financial resources, and
technical experts received the most funding and assistance through hazard mitigation
programs. Future inquiry should focus on these issues of equity in an effort to determine the
root causes of issues.
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Finally, future research should focus not just on hazard mitigation programs but all
assistance programs that FEMA provides to state and local communities. It is likely that the
complexity and administrative burdens that FEMA’s mitigation programs feature extend to
others grants they provide. Future research should focus specifically on post-disaster
recovery grants (e.g. Public Assistance, Individual Assistance) that aid governments and
individual citizens after a disaster. These programs provide direct assistance to those
impacted by disaster, thus, should be accessible and equitable in delivery. This research also
will help determine if the complexities of FEMA’s hazard mitigation programs are unique or
a symptom of a much larger issue.
Recommendations for Practice
This research has direct application to emergency management practitioners and
others who administer hazard mitigation programs. The research exposed many inequities
with program administration, limitations of funding, and complexity that inhibits
practitioners from making significant strides in reducing disaster risk. The following section
provides recommendations for practice.
Emergency management agencies should rethink hazard mitigation and expand the
scope of program delivery and multiagency coordination beyond FEMA hazard mitigation
grants. In most states, resilience-type work is occurring in agencies both within government
and in non-governmental organizations. Emergency managers should apply the model they
use during acute emergencies, that of multiagency coordination, to issues of hazard
mitigation and resilience. State emergency management agencies, in particular, should be the
clearinghouse of all funding and technical assistance programs available to locals. Rather
than focusing on eligibility within FEMA programs they should work with locals to develop
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solutions to disaster risk issues first, then pair appropriate funding or resources to execute the
project. A narrow focus on FEMA’s programs is a disservice to communities in need.
Next, FEMA must drastically reduce the complexity of their grant programs, and
lower the barriers of entry for communities who need the assistance the most. One change
would be to block grant mitigation funding to state emergency management who then in turn
could administer programs. This moves the administrative and programmatic oversite closer
to the communities who apply for these funds. States understand the unique risks their local
communities face much better than the federal government, thus, moving the money closer to
the problem will speed up risk reduction efforts. This approach of course would shift
financial accountability requirements from the federal government to the states. This
responsibility could be addressed in administration plans which FEMA requires of states
prior to award.
Local communities, particularly rural resource constrained communities, should
drastically expand the use of networks for planning and execution of mitigation projects.
Networks provide efficiencies that can overcome many of the challenges of organizational
capacity which this study exposed. The most mature networks share technical resources,
funding, and other services that otherwise may be out of reach for some communities.
Networks also help overcome limitations related to political boundaries. Since disasters do
not observe jurisdictional lines, networks are effective at transcending boundaries and
executing multi-jurisdictional projects.
Finally, practitioners must prioritize equity in program delivery, surging resources
and support into the communities that need assistance the most. This is not an issue limited to
delivery of hazard mitigation programs, rather, must be a pursuit for all emergency
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management functions across the suite of programs and services they deliver. Historical
inequities continue to plague communities throughout the nation and emergency managers
who provide services to disasters survivors when they are in need the most, must conduct a
top to bottom assessment of what they do and how they do it. Public administrators have a
duty to equitably deliver services to all citizens and emergency managers who deal with
citizens during their greatest time of need have an even higher moral requirement to consider
equity in their programs.
Final Concluding Thoughts
The results of this study show how communities who embrace hazard mitigation
programs as a priority have been successful at reducing disaster risk. This however is no
easy task and requires a multifaceted approach that leverages the organizational capabilities
across government and networks, and one that engages community members in the process.
For many communities, in particular those who need assistance the most, this is something
that is out of reach.
In a world where disasters are becoming more complex and one in which climate
change is exacerbating disaster impacts, taking proactive action to reduce disaster risk
continues to be increasingly important. In order to effectuate change communities need to be
innovative in their approaches, leveraging networks, collaborative governance approaches,
and engaging the public. In addition, all levels of government must increase organizational
capacity for hazard mitigation programs. This also includes reducing complexity of
programs and lowering the barrier of entry for communities seeking to reduce disaster risk
through hazard mitigation.
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Appendix I – Definitions and Acronyms
Definitions
Climate Change - significant changes in global temperature, precipitation, wind patterns and
other measures of climate that occur over several decades or longer (University of
California Davis, 2017).
Collaborative Governance - Public policy decision making and management that engage
people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the
public, private and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not
otherwise be accomplished (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2007).
Disaster - The actual occurrence of events that produce casualties and damage at a level
exceeding a community’s ability to cope (Lindell et al., 2006).
Disaster Risk Reduction – Activities aimed to reduce the damage caused by natural hazards
like earthquakes, floods, droughts and cyclones, through an ethic of prevention
(United Nations, 2021).
FEMA Region III – FEMA’s regional office that administers federal programs in Delaware,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West Virginia (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2021c).
Flood Mitigation Assistance - The program authorized by section 1366 of the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 4104c, and implemented at parts 78
and 79 (Cornell Law School, 2009).
Governance - The creation, execution, and implementation of activities backed by the shared
goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have formal authority
(Bingham et al., 2005).
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Hazard - An event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries,
property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the
environment, interruption of business, or other types of harm or loss (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1997).
Hazard Mitigation - Any sustained action taken to reduce long-term risk and future disasters
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2021).
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - The program authorized under section 404 of the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5170c, and
implemented at part 206, subpart N (Cornell Law School, 2009).
Local Community - Local officials across government and citizens who have a vested
interest in hazard mitigation programs.
Network – Multi-organizational arrangements that are used to solve problems (Agranoff &
Mcguire 2003).
Organizational Capacity – The funding, technical expertise of staff, leadership,
communication, (Hartvelt and Okun 1991, Grindle and Hilderbrand 1995, Hartig et
al. 1995) and ability of individuals within an organization to come together to achieve
a common goal (Brody et al. 2008).

Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program - The program authorized under section 203 of the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5133 (Cornell
Law School, 2009).

Risk - A condition in which there is a possibility that persons or property could experience
adverse consequences (Lindell et al., 2006).
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State Hazard Mitigation Officer - The official representative of State government who is the
primary point of contact with FEMA, other Federal agencies, and local governments
in mitigation planning and implementation of mitigation programs and activities
required under the Stafford Act (Cornell Law School, 2009).
Acronyms
BRIC – Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities Program
DMA – Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
DRRA – Disaster Recovery Reform Act
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMA – Flood Mitigation Assistance Program
HMA – Hazard Mitigation Assistance Programs
HMGP – Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HUD – United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
IRB – Institutional Review Board
NFIP – National Flood Insurance Program
NPM – New Public Management
NPS – New Public Service
SHMO – State Hazard Mitigation Officer
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